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Future of Administrative Justice
Symposium Report*
Administrative Justice Working Group**
INTRODUCTION

What is Administrative Justice? At its core, Administrative Justice refers to the system of decision-making of administrative agencies,
boards, commissions and tribunals. As Chief Justice McLachlin of the
Supreme Court of Canada famously observed, "Many more citizens have
their rights determined by these tribunals than by the courts." (Cooper,
1996.) In addition to adjudicating rights and resolving disputes involving
public authority, these administrative bodies also engage in regulatory
decision-making and ensure that government programs operate fairly and
in accordance with the law.
In recent years, there have been several jurisdictions that have
overhauled their Administrative Justice sectors. Currently, there is a lively
debate about the scope, nature and status of Administrative Justice in
Ontario. There are also important developments in peer jurisdictions,
especially in B.C., Quebec and the United Kingdom, which can and should
inform the dialogue in Ontario.
The purpose of the "Future of Administrative Justice" Symposium, held at the Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, on January 1718, 2008, was to bring together a wide range of experts, practitioners and
observers of administrative justice to explore the dynamics of administrative justice and possible directions of reform. The Symposium was
generously supported by the Law Foundation of Ontario, Legal Aid Ontario and the Faculty of Law, University of Toronto.
A webcast of the Symposium itself may be found on the University of Toronto, Faculty of Law website. 1
The Administrative Justice Bibliography (AJB) (discussed below
in Appendix "A") was launched at the Symposium as an ongoing resource
for those interested in finding out more about Administrative Justice.

*
**
1

January 17 & 18, 2008, University of Toronto, Faculty of Law. Organized by the
Administrative Justice Working Group.
Executive Members: Lorne Sossin, Ron Ellis, Kathy Laird, Ivana Petricone,
Carol Prest, and Jo-Ann Seamon. With thanks to Evgeny Zbrowski, the Symposium RA who had a hand in drafting the Report.
On Ii ne: http://www. law .utoronto.ca/conferences/admi njustice. html.
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The Symposium was organized by the Administrative Justice
Working Group (AJWG), a public interest network of lawyers, participants in the administrative tribunal sector and academics seeking to advance administrative justice issues in Ontario. AJWG grew out of an ad
hoc Ontario legal clinic network called the Government Adjudicative
Agencies Group (GAAG) that began in 2001 with the goal of improving
the administrative justice system its most disenfranchised participants,
low-income Ontarians. Both AJWG and GAAG are informal and unincorporated network organizations.
The Organizing Committee of the Administrative Justice Working Group for the Symposium consisted of Ron Ellis, Alec Farquhar,
Kathy Laird, Ivana Petricone, Carole Prest, Jo-Ann Seamon and Lorne
Sossin.
The Organizing Committee wishes to thank Jennifer Tam and
Dylan Reid of the Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, for their assistance in supporting the Symposium, and Evgeny Zborovsky for his assistance in preparing this report.
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KEYNOTE ADDRESS BY LORD JUSTICE CARNWATH
Lord Justice Carnwath set the stage for the Symposium by focusing on the ways in which recent reforms in the U.K. have transformed
administrative justice, and highlighting key areas of continuing debate
about the nature of administrative justice and its role within the justice
system.
Lord Justice Carnwath emphasized the importance of the recognition of administrative tribunals as an integral part of the justice system
in the Tribunals, Courts, and Enforcement Act (2007):
The key message of the new Act is that tribunals are no longer the Cinderellas of the justice system. Tribunal justice is real justice, and a distinctive
and vital part of the judicial system; and tribunal "judges" (as they will now
be called - rather than commissioners, panelists, adjudicators or whatever)
are full members of the independent judiciary. Section I of the Tribunals
Act underlines the point, by extending to them the statutory guarantee of
judicial independence. conferred on the court judiciary by the Constitutional
Reform Act 2005. 2

2

Lord Justice Camwath, Keynote Address. In response to a question, Lord Justice
Camwath noted that although the Franks report recognized tribunals as independent adjudicators, they continued to be administered by the government departments
whose decision they reviewed and it was not until the recommendations in the
Leggatt report to create an integrated. independent tribunal system, that the idea
of independent adjudicators was realized.
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At the same time, Lord Justice Carnwath noted some continuing
questions about the place of administrative tribunals in the U.K. justice
system.
Applying for Membership in International Association of Supreme Administrative Judges (IASAJ), for example, raised the question
of whether a tribunal exercising appellate jurisdiction in a common law
nation could be seen as a 'supreme administrative tribunal' if it is still
subject to further appeal or review by the courts. The answer seems to be
"Yes", following the example of the Australian Administrative Appeals
Tribunal (AA T), which has been recognized as a full member of IASAJ
on the basis that it exercises the highest purely administrative jurisdiction.
Lord Justice Carnwath also recounted a speech delivered by the
Vice President of France's Conseil d'Etat, M. Jean-Marc Sauve, which
highlighted both the similarity and the differences between the direction
of administrative justice in the U.K. and in France. As with the Upper
Tribunal in the U.K over which Lord Justice Carnwath will preside as
Senior President of Tribunals, the Conseil d'Etat has evolved into an
appellate body that hears cases from a host of administrative tribunals of
first instance. However, unlike in the U.K., the Conseil d'Etat has maintained an advisory role to government, while successfully safeguarding
its independence through the use of ethical walls and other protections.
In the U.K., by contrast, the creation of the Supreme Court to take over
the role of the House of Lords as the highest appellate body was said to
be necessary to ensure independence.
Lord Justice Carnwath also explored the categorization of tribunals, and advocated a flexible approach that embraces both disputes between individuals that are not directly concerned with public administration (for example, a labour board or landlord and tenant tribunal), and
administrative disputes between individuals and the state (for example, a
social benefits tribunal).
Finally, Lord Justice Carnwath explored the relationship between
courts, tribunals, mediators and ombudsmen. Here, too, a flexible and
integrated approach was advocated. While tribunals continue to have a
unique role to play in delivering expert, flexible and efficient justice, we
need to take a broad view and ensure that courts, tribunals, mediators and
ombudsmen are all able to work togetherto address the everyday problems
of, and effectively communicate with, the ordinary citizens who use the
justice system. The hope for the future of administrative justice is that
"we will have a fully integrated administrative justice system, which
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includes everyone engaged in the business of resolving administrative
disputes, and there are prayers for all." 3
1. NEW FRONTIERS OF MERIT IN TRIBUNAL APPOINTMENTS

Judith McCormack (Downtown Legal Services) began the discussion with an insightful analysis of "What We Talk About When We
Talk About Merit and Why It Isn't Enough". McCormack argued that we
need to move from a culture of amateurism to one of professionalism and
start thinking of adjudicators like other professionals who receive years
of training, apprenticeship and licensing.
Merit-based appointments have been defined in reaction to the
worst government practices associated with patronage appointments,
where positions are offered to reward constituencies and supporters, and
the appointment and re-appointment processes are manipulated to attempt
to influence decision-making. The patronage model was invested in the
idea that anyone can be an adjudicator, and that all they needed was a
smattering of experience, a little on-the-job training, and maybe some
mentorship. This view of adjudicators, of course, flies in the face of the
idea that tribunals are specialized bodies, with unique expertise in their
fields, and it presents the most serious impediment to the professionalization of administrative tribunals.
The discussion of merit has taken place in three arenas: (I) in the
courts, (2) through governmental initiatives to reform the appointment
process, and (3) through tribunals' own efforts to design and implement
training, selection criteria, and performance evaluation. All three, McCormack argued, have come short in significant ways.
The courts are inherently limited because they can only reach
back to questions of merit through individual party rights. Courts are thus
unlikely to address what constitutes merit, what is a merit appointment,
or other fundamental systemic issues. To some extent, they also should
not do so. Where courts have intervened, the results have not provided
consistent guidance, and, in some cases, the courts have even sanctioned
bad government practices. Although the courts do have the advantage of
being able to tell governments what to do where there is little political
will for reform, and are familiar with norms of judicial independence,
courts have been reluctant to apply judicial norms to administrative tribunals, or have attenuated them. McCormack argued that we should give

1
·

Lord Justice Carnwath, Keynote Address.
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up on the courts because they are just the wrong place for the discussion
of merit.
Government reforms to the appointment process, while highly
laudable, should be viewed as just the beginning of the discussion of
merit, not the end. Government initiatives tend to focus on fairness,
transparency and accessibility. This is obviously commendable because
it may encourage more qualified people to apply and create a more diverse
and representative body. But it also has two weaknesses. First, it does not
necessarily ensure that you have a highly qualified pool of applicants.
Second, and more importantly, it perpetuates the culture of amateurism,
the idea that anyone can do these jobs. In moving from a historical context
of patronage appointment to issues of fairness and openness, we are still
looking at the adjudicators' jobs as plum positions for which no special
qualifications are required, but now we are making sure that everyone has
a fair shot at them. Term appointments are a good example of this: they
make it difficult for someone to develop professional expertise as an
adjudicator, but they do make sure that lots of different citizens have a
turn at the jobs. This is in sharp contrast to other professions, which place
a premium on developing experience and expertise.
Similarly, the efforts of tribunals are good as far as they go.
However, these also still reflect the amateur model of adjudication. For
example, the excellent training programs created by tribunals and organizations like the Society of Ontario Adjudicators and Regulators (SOAR)
are designed to take someone from adjudicator kindergarten to graduation
in a few days. Their focus on basics like "what is a tribunal?" reflects the
wide acceptance of the idea that no special skills or knowledge are required to become an adjudicator.
McCormack suggested that three kinds of skills are required for
professional adjudicators: ( 1) legal skills in interpreting and applying
laws, (2) skills in the specialized field of the tribunal, and (3) adjudication
skills. McCormack emphasized the importance of non-legal expertise and
adjudication expertise, noting in particular that we need to move away
from the idea that policy considerations are inherently subjective, and
recognize that there is objective social science that can be brought to bear
on the problems being dealt with by tribunals. Finally, McCormack proposed that we address concerns about accessibility and diversity by improving access to the training needed to become a professional adjudicator, and think of the training programs as the point of entry into the
profession, rather than focusing on the selection and appointment process.
Dr. Lilian Ma (Landlord and Tenant Board) continued the
discussion by providing insight into the recruitment and retention issues
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facing a real-life tribunal, the Landlord and Tenant Board of Ontario
(LTB).
Ma described her own appointment as Chair as an example of the
new process for public appointments in Ontario, and how it provided the
basis for a positive partnership in which Ma as the Chair and the responsible minister were able "to do great things together".
L TB is a generalist tribunal, with a highly de-centralized structure. When Ma began as Chair of LTB in 2005, it was faced with a heavy
caseload, a high rate of member vacancies, and low morale. The members
had not received a raise in pay for many years, and were paid less than
mediators, who were civil servants. There were also not enough regional
Vice Chairs to make sure that members received appropriate mentoring
and support. Poaching by other tribunals, which offered better pay for
less work, was also very common.
L TB created a Members Human Resources Committee to address
these concerns, and developed a strategy for recruitment and retention. In
September 2006, the members' remuneration was increased, and morale
has improved. The term of appointment has also been changed from six
to ten years, which encourages greater professionalization. Members now
have more time to develop skills as adjudicators and then move on to
other tribunals using the skills they have gained at LTB.
The continuing problems facing LTB include poaching by other
tribunals and training. Ma suggested that rather than viewing each tribunal
as its 'own shop', which competes for qualified appointees against other
tribunals, a system-wide approach is necessary, in which tribunals would
work together in recruitment and retention. Similarly, greater cooperation
with the government is needed to improve training. For example, Ma
suggested that training programs that are open to civil servants could be
made also available to tribunal members.
Michael Gottheil (Ontario Human Rights Tribunal) offered a
second perspective on the appointment process from a tribunal's point of
view. Gottheil proposed that the new frontier of merit in tribunal appointment is the creation of a dynamic and flexible process that is tribunalspecific and tribunal-driven.
Until now, merit has stood for a broad notion that the people
appointed to a tribunal should be qualified and should be selected through
an open and transparent process. However, the qualifications have tended
to be externally defined, not internally within the tribunal itself, and the
design of the appointment process has been done on a one-size-fits-all
model.
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The new appointment process will be focused on the specific
mandate of the tribunal and enable the tribunal to define what qualifications are needed to fulfill its mandate. The new appointment process will
also be dynamic and flexible to allow the set of qualifications to change
over time as the nature of the tribunal's work, the community it serves,
and society at large changes.
Gottheil suggested that access to justice concerns in particular
will be key to how tribunals define merit. Traditionally, when we think
about merit we really look at the substantive legal area of the tribunal and
for qualifications in that legal area. More recently, there is an understanding that core competencies also include an ability to adjudicate disputes
and alternative dispute resolution skills. In the new approach to merit,
qualifications will be defined more broadly, based on the specific tribunal's work and its users. Tribunals are different from generalist courts
and from each other; each tribunal is unique. Tribunals serve clients who
are not usually regular users of the legal system. For them, the tribunal is
often their one shot at justice. The qualifications required will be defined
by the needs of these users and the need to enhance access to justice.
Finally, Gottheil addressed the question of how we can move to
this new approach to merit. The key, Gottheil argued, is a shift towards a
recognition of the role of tribunals in defining merit and designing the
appropriate appointment process, as well as trust by governments in tribunal chairs. The chair of a tribunal should be given the latitude to set
core competencies and the final selection decision should be based on the
recommendation of the tribunal chair.
Debra Roberts (Public Appointments Secretariat, Government of Ontario) next described the changes to the appointment process
put in place by the Liberal Government in Ontario since 2003.
The basic philosophy underlying the government's approach has
been to ensure that people appointed are qualified and that they are
representative of the population of Ontario.
In November 2003, when Roberts assumed her role, there was a
backlog in appointments and pressure from tribunal chairs to fill vacancies.
Roberts was faced with the question of what is merit and who
determines merit. It became clear that the best way to ensure a meritorious
and open process was to allow the tribunal chairs to have input into the
selection process. Chairs are uniquely situated to understand the needs of
their members.
The first key change made by PAS was the decision to advertise
positions. All chair and full-time member positions are advertised. For

FUTURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE

20 I

other positions, advertising will depend on the needs of the tribunal. PAS
also created a more accessible website to give information on the appointment process and vacancies. Applications for positions are now webbased and information on new appointees is posted on the website. PAS
has become the point of contact for applicants and the start and end of the
selection process. All resumes come into the PAS office. Paneled interviews are conducted for chairs and full-time members. Finally, background security checks are now performed for all applicants, and applicants are required to provide a declaration of any conflicts of interest they
may have.
Overall, these changes have been successful in creating a more
fair and open process. The new process recognizes the important role of
tribunal chairs. Advertising has been successful in attracting qualified
people from both Ontario and abroad.
The government has also completed reforms in the remuneration
of tribunal members and term limits. The government recognized that it
is difficult to attract highly qualified people without adequate compensation, but politically this was a challenging issue. Remuneration of tribunal members is now tied to senior-management pay levels in the civil
service, and increases in keeping with them. Term limits, where they are
applicable, have been increased to allow tribunal members to develop
expertise, and have been tied to remuneration increases to reflect a member's growing experience. The current model is as follows:
•

two-year initial term for a new adjudicator;

•

three-year reappointment term (with a raise);

•

five-year reappointment term (with another raise).

There is a total ten-year limit on appointment to the same position.
However, when a member is appointed to a new position, such as that of
a vice-chair, the clock restarts and the term limit for the new position is
again ten years. This is a further recognition that tribunal members perform a professional role.
Looking into the future, Roberts mentioned the recent clustering
project led by Kevin Whittaker. This was a pilot exercise to explore how
tribunals can share resources through cross-appointments, joint websites,
combined training and so on. It is hoped that this will continue. Finally,
Roberts also mentioned the importance of working on improving training
for tribunal members in partnership with organizations such as SOAR.
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Q&A (moderated by Lorne Sossin, University of Toronto)
There was a hrief Q&A discussion. Lorne Sossin drew attention
to the changing nature of appointments to administrative trihunals and
queried whether, as we move towards greater convergence in our approach
to appointments across different trihunals, we will increasingly come to
recognize that there is an administrative justice system and expect that,
like the justice system, it would fall under the responsihility of a single
government ministry, rather than the current system of separate fiefdoms,
in which different trihunals are heing managed hy different line ministries.
Another question raised was whether it would make sense to
enshrine the special expertise of the trihunal hy specifying in the legislation the qualifications required of memhers, as has heen done to some
extent in the legislation for the Ontario Human Rights Trihunal. McCormack found that this may he a good way to estahlish legal and non-legal
expertise requirements, hut noted that, as Gottheil pointed out, the qualifications required may change. McCormack also pointed out that a trihunal may need different memhers to have different expertise. Gottheil
agreed that this may he a good idea, hut any legislation would need to
have a halance hetween specificity and tlexihility.
2. CURRENT ISSUES IN TRIBUNAL INDEPENDENCE
David Mullan (Professor Emeritus, Queen's) introduced the
discussion of independence hy returning to Lilian Ma's statement that she
was ahle to work with the Minister "to do great things together". One way
to think ahout issues of independence is to ask to what extent trihunals
and the government should he ahle to do great things together.
Mullan noted the recent controversy over the Canadian Nuclear
Safety Commission's (CNSC) decision to shut down due to safety concerns the Chalk River nuclear facility run hy Atomic Energy of Canada
Limited AECL (a Federal Crown Corporation), and the suhsequent decision hy Parliament to override the decision of the CNSC hecause it
produced urgently needed medical isotopes, and the suhsequent government decision to dismiss the Chair of the CNSC, Linda Keen. Did CNSC
and the government cease to he ahle to do great things together? When
does lack of confidence in the Chair of a trihunal justify his or her
dismissal?
Ron Ellis (Osgoode Hall Law School) discussed the issues
raised hy the McKenzie case ahout constitutional guarantees of independ-
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ence. 4 The basic issue at stake in the case according to Ellis is whether,
in administrative justice, legislative sovereignty trumps the rule of law or
vice versa. Is judicial independence of rights adjudicators, the cornerstone
of the rule of law, merely optional?
Ellis drew on two examples to show the urgency of this question.
First, Ellis noted the recent change in the adjudication of landlord and
tenant disputes in British Columbia. Since 2006, landlords in B.C. can
obtain final eviction notices from government employees in the Ministry
of Housing. Should governments be able to transfer judicial functions,
Ellis asked, to governmental employees? Are we comfortable with a
constitution that allows landlords, including public housing corporations,
to get final eviction orders by applying to government employees?
Second, Ellis turned to the change at issue in the McKenzie case
itself. Since 2003, B.C. has claimed the right to terminate the appointment
of any adjudicator at any time without cause with one year's pay in lieu
of notice. Should a legislature be free to make all adjudicators government
employees? Given that the government hires, decides what adjudicators
will get paid, and is able to dismiss them without cause, can they be
viewed as anything other than government employees?
The courts in the McKenzie case are faced with the question of
whether, ifthe B.C. legislature in fact intended to authorize the executive
branch to terminate adjudicative tribunal members without cause, it was
acting beyond its constitutional powers. At trial, the B.C. Supreme Court
said yes. 5 At the Court of Appeal, the decision took a beating but survived.
If the Supreme Court of Canada grants leave and agrees with the B.C.
Supreme Court, there will be a new chapter in constitutional law. 6 Once
we get past the question of whether a constitutional requirement of judicial
independence applies to any tribunals at all, and it seems inconceivable
that it will not eventually be seen to apply to some tribunals, then we will
have to deal with the questions of what kinds of tribunals it does apply
to, under what circumstances, and to what effect. The answers to these
questions have the potential to transform our administrative justice system, to "justicize" it. McKenzie has given these questions renewed life.

•
5

6

McKenzie v. British Columbia (Minister of Public Safety), 2007 CarswellBC 250 I,
2007 BCCA 507 (B.C. C.A.).
McKenzie v. British Columbia (Minister ofPublic Safety), 2006 CarswellBC 2262,
2006 BCSC 1372 (B.C. S.C.).
McKenzie v. British Columbia (Minister of Public Safety) (April 24, 2008), Doc.
32398. 2008 CarswellBC 824, 2008 CarswellBC 825 (S.C.C.).
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Ellis next provided a historical context for the evolution of judicial independence in Canadian law. No one has ever doubted that judicial
independence was the cornerstone of the rule of law. However, prior to
the watershed Supreme Court of Canada decision in Valente, provincial
court judges and administrative tribunal members were regarded as independent in law, even though they were dependent in fact. 7 For example,
prior to 1962, all Ontario provincial court judges were appointed at pleasure, and until 1982, judges who served after the age of 65 until the
mandatory retirement age of 75 were appointed at pleasure. Most adjudicative tribunal members were also appointed at pleasure. All of this
changed in 1985 with Valente.
Ellis urged that we must not forget how the law used to reconcile
dependency in fact with independence in law through what he called the
"hope and a prayer" doctrine, or the trust doctrine. Courts believed that
honourable men appointed as judges and adjudicators would perform their
duties diligently and not allow the government's powers to effect their
decisions. Governments, in turn, were trusted to refrain from abusing their
powers to interfere with the courts' and tribunals' independence. Absent
positive evidence of impropriety, the law presumed that judges and adjudicators were independent even if they were in fact dependent.
The revolutionary insight in Valente was that independence must
be protected through specific provisions of law that provide objective
structural guarantees of independence. It is essential to realize that this
change has implicitly and radically altered the nature of the debate about
the relationship between tribunals and governments, and has raised a new
constitutional issue:
In our justice system history, the presumption of independence had always
finessed the issue of independence.

Post-Valente, none of that can any longer withstand scrutiny, the presumption is gone, the finesse no longer applies and the issue is now front and
centre to be faced, addressed, and determined. All of these structural relationships [between line ministries and 'their' tribunals] must now be seen
to be, at least arguably, incompatible in law with judicial independence.
And, suddenly we are faced, really for the first time in our history, with a
clear question as to whether we, as a society, are prepared to mandate
legislatures to remove judicial functions from the courts, or to create new
judicial functions, and assign those functions to institutions and/or individuals who, it is now clear, arc not, in law, judicially independent.

7

Valente v. R. ( 1985), 1985 CarswellOnt 129, 24 D.L.R. (4th) 161 (S.C.C.).
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Are we, that is, prepared to agree that in our administrative justice systems
- systems in which we now acknowledge the bulk of the rights disputes of
our citizens are decided - the rule of law is merely optional?"

Laverne Jacobs (University of Windsor) continued the discussion by sharing insights into the tension between expertise and independence from her empirical research into tribunal culture. Jacobs' research
picks up where Valente leaves off by examining what conditions, in
addition to those identified in Valente of security of tenure, financial
security, and administrative control, are required for independence in an
expert tribunal.
Jacobs' research focused on access to information and privacy
commissions, using a quantitative and empirical approach. Jacobs conducted interviews with tribunal staff and observed the day-to-day work
at the Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC) of Ontario and the
Quebec Commission d'acces a /'information (CAI).
Jacobs' research identified a "de facto separation of policy-making and adjudicative functions" at the tribunals that was driven by concerns about safeguarding the independence of adjudicators. IPC has a
multi-functional mandate that includes education of the public, disputes
regarding access to government information, privacy complaints, and a
policy function on access and privacy matters. Jacobs noted that a common discourse at IPC was one of "separate worlds". The expertise developed by the policy branch was not applied directly in the adjudicative
function of the tribunal. Adjudicators making decisions were seen as
"independent" and there was thus a "hands-off' approach, which separated the policy-making expertise from the adjudicative function.
CAI also had a dual mandate at the time of Jacobs' research.
However, the legislature, motivated by a report submitted by CAI, began
examining bifurcating the adjudicative and policy functions because of a
perceived conflict between the two. There was a concern that decisionmakers would form a 'closed mind' because of policy work, such as
reviewing and providing comments to the government on legislation.
Although there was a clear understanding that an adjudicator would be
free to change her mind if she was asked to make a decision concerning
legislation that the tribunal has previously provided policy guidance on,
the government ultimately decided in 2006 to bifurcate the tribunal and
the policy function was transferred to a government ministry.
The lesson of Jacobs' research is that there may be unexpected
tensions, both in theory and in actual practice, between expertise and
"

Ellis. The Big Question.

206

CON. JOURNAL OF ADMIN. LAW & PRACTICE [21 CJ.A.LP.]

independence, and between "expert decision-making" and simple "everyday justice" for ordinary citizens. It remains to be determined whether
this tension can be resolved and, if so, whether legislative provisions,
which delineate different roles and functions within tribunals, or constitutional guarantees of independence, would provide the best theoretical
resolution and practical guidance to tribunals.
Audrey Macklin (University of Toronto) made the case for
greater empirical research of the kind undertaken by Jacobs, and also
returned to McCormack' s questioning of the role of the courts in defining
merit, by examining two basic questions about the role of legal rules in
creating the conditions for independence:
(I)

Are the existing legal rules adequate to ensuring independence?

(2)

Are legal rules per se to some degree inadequate to the task of
creating independence?

With respect to the first question, Macklin highlighted key issues
in independence that have not yet been addressed by legal rules: the
appointment and re-appointment process. What kinds of legal rules can
be used to address these problems? One radical possibility that Macklin
noted is the possibility of a human rights complaint for discrimination on
the basis of political opinion (or lack thereof), as was brought by one
tribunal member in Nova Scotia. While this option may seem far-fetched,
it does provide a striking new way of looking at patronage appointments.
Macki in also reflected on her experience as a member of the Immigration
and Refugee Board (IRB), where the political nature of re-appointment
decisions undermined the authority of the chair and vice-chairs and corroded the internal structure of the IRB. Legal rules are needed to safeguard
both the external and internal independence of tribunals, but it is also
important to recognize the need to ensure that the internal management
of the tribunal is not undermined by external influence.
One reason for optimism, in Macklin' s view, is that as the judicial
appointment process and judicial independence are developed in case law
and in political reforms, there may be more willingness to apply the same
kind of attention to at least some tribunals. Here an analogy can be drawn
between the duty to provide reasons: as judges were increasingly required
to provide written reasons, so were tribunals.
Macklin then discussed the potential inherent limitations of legal
rules. Even the best rules can be circumvented where there is lack of
political will or where the principles underlying the legal rules have not
been absorbed by the organization's culture.
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We can imagine circumstances, Macklin argued, where the Valente rules are neither necessary nor sufficient. For example, the Crown
Attorney's office is a part of the Ministry of the Attorney General, a line
ministry. But in Ontario, the independence of the Crown Attorney's office
is fairly well established. 9 In Nova Scotia, by contrast, independence at
the Crown Attorney's office became a serious problem and led to the
recommendation of creating a separate Director of Public Prosecutions in
the Marshall Inquiry in 1989.
What makes the difference? The internalization of the underlying
principles seems to be particularly important. Legal rules may never get
to what it takes to create a culture of independence. This suggests that the
work being done by Jacobs is crucial to a better understanding of independence. Macklin urged the importance of studying both structures that
work and those that don't work. More than legal skills may be needed for
this task: we should bring sociological and ethnographic research to bear
on these questions.
Adam Dodek (Visiting Scholar, Osgoode/Toronto) (commentator) next asked whether, when it comes to independence, it is possible
to have too much of a good thing. The usual question is: "How do we
maximize independence?" Dodek suggested that we should focus instead
on the question: "How do we do great things together?"
We tend to focus on independence as the opposite of dependence,
and identify it with self-reliance, autonomy, and ability to fulfill one's
own mandate. These are the ideal types that animate the discussion of
independence.
Independence, however, can also connote lack of connection, Jack
of relationships, separateness, being cut-off from parts of society, and
orphaning. Independence can be used in the context of administrative
justice to orphan a tribunal, to deprive it of a champion, to leave it out in
the wind. The most common ways governments interfere with tribunals
is simply by ignoring them, leaving them starved for cash, etc.
One notable example of this danger arose in Ontario in connection
with the reforms to the Ontario Human Rights Commission (OHRC).
There was a perception that OHRC was not independent enough. A proposal was made to make the Commissioner an independent officer of the
9

[It should be noted here that the division between the dual role of the Attorney
General as both a cabinet member and Attorney General has not been unproblematic in Ontario. and both court decisions and political leadership, most notably
by the Hon. Roy McMurtry, have helped to entrench the principles of independence.]
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Legislature, on the same footing as the privacy commissioner and Ombudsman. But this was an elevation of form over substance. This could
have meant that the responsibility for OHRC would be transferred from
yet another ministry, the Ministry of the Attorney General, to the office
of the legislature. It would have also meant that the budget would have
been transferred from MAG to the legislature. This would have been
detrimental to human rights in Ontario. Human rights need champions,
and had OHRC become an independent officer of the legislature, these
champions would have been lost. Independence can sound very good in
and of itself, and it can be tempting for governments to pursue it at the
expense of actually creating a stronger system for rights protection.
The imperative for the future of administrative justice is the
urgent crisis in the civil justice system, which is no longer affordable to
most Ontarians. The reality is that the administrative justice system is
where most people see any sort of justice. Whether administrative justice
is seen as part of the judicial branch or the executive, it must been seen
as part of the justice system as a whole, and it must be recognized that
changes within it can have impact elsewhere.
Dodek concluded by urging us to think of independence as a
spectrum, to think of relationships, and as much as possible try to institutionalize those relationships. Independence alone will not lead to effective administrative justice and too much independence can be a bad thing.

Q&A (moderated by David Mullan)
A Q&A discussion followed the presentations. Mullan noted that
the whole issue of independence has very different dimensions for tribunals than it does for the courts and warned that excessive demands for
independence can be counterproductive. The more we demand independence, the more we may be moving independence in the direction of the
courts.
Lord Justice Carnwath noted that there seems to be a much
broader understanding of administrative justice at work in Canada. He
understood administrative justice as reviewing decisions of the administration, but in Canada it seems administrative justice is a broader concept
for adjudication outside of the regular court system.
Jacobs confirmed the broad conception of administrative justice
in Canada. Review of public administration is more common and prominent in Quebec. Many parts of the administrative justice system in Canada
are hived-off parts of the courts, such as landlord and tenant dispute
resolution.
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A question was asked about whether the broad nature of administrative justice has major implications for independence. Independence
from whom? Why can't the government make landlord and tenant decisions?
Ellis replied that what is at stake is the ability of an adjudicator
to make decisions that are contrary to government policy in applying the
statute. The culture of independent thinking, the environment in which
an adjudicator works that fosters that sense of objective and independent
thinking, is just not part of the culture of the employee in a ministry.
Ma noted that "to do great things together", a tribunal chair and
the Minister can use mechanisms such as memoranda of understanding
to clarify roles and responsibilities and to institutionalize relationships.
In practice, the utopia of absolute independence may not exist. However,
'comfort zones' can be created to preserve the separation of roles, and
with the right person, this can be made to work. From a structural point
of view, we have to find a practical way to apply theoretical ideas. The
most important thing is to make it work for the users of the tribunals.
Ellis noted that what troubled him is that such arrangements are
so idiosyncratic and contingent on particular persons and a particular
political environment. At the moment, we are living in a renaissance
period in Ontario. But the trouble is what happens when the government
changes. Without some legal structure in place, you can suddenly wind
up with dysfunctional, uncaring tribunals. It can all tum on a dime.
Another question was about the relationship between the culture
of a tribunal and legal rules, and the extent to which legal rules can develop
to recognize the relationships and structures in place on the ground. For
example, in CUPE v. Ontario (Minister of Labour) (2003), courts seem
to have recognized an independence norm that had developed in Ontario
with respect to private, interest arbitrators. But there is a tension between
freezing any culture through legal rules and adapting legal rules to new
developments.
Macklin agreed that there is a constant feedback between institutional culture and legal rules. Legal rules can catch up to the reality on
the ground or they can kick-in to constrain it.
The discussion concluded with a question about whether imposing the requirements of the rule of law on all tribunals is too inflexible
and too much of a good thing. It seems most applicable to adjudicative
tribunals. In the context of multi-functional tribunals, which combine
adjudication and regulation, greater partnership is needed between the
tribunal and the government, and greater flexibility.
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Ellis stressed that the important thing is to have legal structures
in place that are true to the rule of law, as is the case now in the United
Kingdom. You can make practical accommodations within these structures. The rule of law as laid down in Valente is flexible and has different
consequences for different institutions. But structures are a must. And
one of the structures that should be in place is a constitutional safeguard
of independence for institutions charged with determining people's rights.

3. NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN TRIBUNAL REFORM
Justice John Evans (Federal Court of Appeal) began the discussion of tribunal reform by recalling the many reports and studies that
have been produced on the subject in Ontario. Margot Priest, in her paper
on the "Tribunal from Hell", catalogued and summarized many of these
studies and recommendations. 10 "If words were actions," Justice Evans
said, "we would have the very best tribunal system in Canada."
Justice Evans reminded the conference that tribunals in Ontario,
and in Canada in general, have been leaders in fields such as worker's
compensation, human rights, pay equity, and immigration and refugee
determination. There is, however, currently some inertia, a failure of
political will, and a persistent ambivalence about the place of tribunals.
There used to be a belief that tribunals, if they were subsumed in the
justice system, would end up at the bottom of the heap as inferior courts.
Tribunals were administering controversial social programs, and were at
the sharp end of the new regulatory and welfare state. Collective labour
bargaining is but one example of the controversial role of tribunals. The
view was, therefore, that if tribunals were included in the court system,
their ability to administer their mandate would be undermined. As a result,
the tribunals were defined in opposition to the courts. However, saying
"we're not like courts" only gets you so far. Today, tribunals must face
the challenge of establishing an identity in the eyes of the courts, the
government and the public.
(a) "Lessons from the U.K."
Lord Justice Carnwath provided a comparative U.K. perspective on many of the issues that had been raised in preceding conference
discussions.
10

M. Priest, "Structure and Accountability of Administrative Agencies" ( 1992)
Spec. Leet. L.S.U.C. 11.
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Lord Justice Carnwath began outlining the recent reforms in the
U.K. by noting that it took more than 50 years to move from the recognition in the Franks Report that tribunals are not merely "appendages of
the government" and are part of the "machinery of adjudication rather
than the machinery of administration" to the full-fledged realization of
these ideas in the recommendations of the Leggatt Report in 2001 and the
resulting legislative reforms. 11
When it comes to "doing great things together", the U.K. has had
to face head-on the difficulties in institutionalizing the relationship between the executive, the courts, and the tribunals due to the decision to
abolish the historical role of the Lord Chancellor, who is the head of
judicial system, the speaker of the House of Lords, and a member of the
cabinet combined through a convenient fiction in a single person the
legislative, executive and judicial branches of government. The approach
has been to develop a "Partnership Model" between the Lord Chief Justice
and the Secretary of State, and, it is expected, the Senior President of the
Tribunals and the Secretary of State. There will be an advisory board
established that will give the judiciary input into the administration of the
justice system.
Judicial appointments in the U.K., including appointments to
tribunals, have been dealt with in the past by the Lord Chancellor, and
there have not been serious problems with patronage. In 2005, the Constitutional Reform Act set up a new judicial appointments commission
that is entirely independent. The commission provides advice to the Secretary of State on all judicial appointments, with very limited grounds for
the Secretary of State to refuse an appointment.
Remuneration and security of tenure have also been fairly good
in the U.K. system. There are no time-limited appointments and tribunal
judges can be removed for cause. Recommendations with respect to remuneration are made by the Review Body on Senior Salaries. Tribunal
judges' pay is related to that of court judges. The system is seen to be fair
and there is general satisfaction. The Secretary of State has recently agreed
to extend statutory protections against reductions in salary to tribunal
judges.
Lord Justice Carnwath emphasized that in his view the key starting point is to decide what the role of tribunals and tribunal members is.

II

Tribunals for Users: One System, One Service: Report of the Review of Tribunals
by Sir Andrew Leggatt (March 2001), online: http://www.tribunals-review.org.uk/leggatthtm/leg-OO.htm (accessed May 5, 2008).
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The rest will fall into place. In the U.K., it's clear that it is to administer
justice.

(b) "Lessons from Quebec"
France Houle (University of Montreal) discussed three key
reforms created by the 1996 Act respecting administrative justice in Quebec: the founding of the Conseil de la justice administrative (CJA), the
creation of two sets of procedural guidelines for administrative and adjudicative tribunals, and the establishment of the Administrative Tribunal
of Quebec (T AQ).
CJA has a dual role: it deals with complaints against administrative judges for breach of the Code of Ethics, and it provides recommendations for procedural improvements to the government.
The two sets of procedural guidelines for administrative and
adjudicative tribunals reflect a distinction drawn between adjudication
and public administration in Quebec, and were an important part of the
reforms.
The creation of the T AQ followed three major reports by working
groups in Quebec led by Professor Dussault ( 197 l ), Professor Ouellette
( 1987), and Professor Garant ( 1994). While Dussault began with the idea
of creating a new administrative court, the current model and organization
of the T AQ follows the recommendations of Ouellete and Garant. Ouellette proposed the creation of new administrative tribunals, rather than
courts, in order to maintain simplicity, flexibility, expertise, and other
unique qualities of administrative tribunals. He proposed four administrative appeal tribunals. Garant's recommendations built on this by proposing to create a single tribunal with four divisions based on the Ouellette
proposals.
The four divisions of T AQ are:
1.

Social Affairs division - social benefits and indemnities (9,200
annual decisions; 57 full-time members and 26 part-time members);

2.

Immovable Property division - municipal taxation ( 1,200 annual
decisions, 21 members);

3.

Territory and Environment - land issues (200 decisions, 3 members); and

4.

Economic Affairs - permits and licenses ( 100 decisions, 4 members).
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T AQ is a purely adjudicative tribunal. Any fields concerned with
policy-making have been left out, including labour relations, worker's
compensation, regulatory boards and landlord and tenant disputes (the
Regic du logement has a limited policy function in determining the allowable annual rent increase).
The Minister of Justice is responsible for T AQ, it is part of the
justice system, but is not necessarily seen as part of the judiciary. The
move to the Ministry of Justice was seen as very important for ensuring
the independence of T AQ members.
The appointment of T AQ members has evolved since its inception. Initially, in 1996, members were appointed for a five-year term. In
2005, the government successfully passed a legislative amendment to
create tenured appointments for T AQ members. T AQ members are now
appointed during good behaviour. This was a somewhat unexpected
change, especially because the five-year term was found to be constitutionally acceptable in the Barreau de Montreal decision. The reasons
behind the change are unclear. It may reflect the close connection between
the bar and notaries and the current Liberal government in Quebec.
As part of the trade-off for the creation of tenured appointments,
T AQ members and the President of T AQ agreed to undergo and administer performance reviews for members. T AQ has formed a committee
and began a pilot project in 2006 in partnership with the Ecole nationale
d'administration publique (ENAP). The performance review process is
confidential: the members' identities are concealed with file numbers and
only the President of T AQ is able to match up members with the file
numbers. The evaluations are performed by sending out surveys to parties,
lawyers and colleagues based on numbers that are statistically valid. A
preliminary report was made public in March 2007, which was largely
positive. A telephone survey was also done with unrepresented parties
who had appeared before T AQ, again with positive feedback. In the next
stage of the project, ENAP will send individual reports on each member
to the President.
Houle reflected on the fact that T AQ is slowly becoming more
and more like a court of justice. Although it was intended to maintain its
flexibility and specialization as a tribunal, today it is increasingly controlled by lawyers and notaries. T AQ is thus moving back towards the
initial model of an administrative court that was proposed by Dussault.
This development raises the question of how we want to structure public
administration. Do we want tribunals to be part of the justice system and
judiciary? If so, then they will become like courts, and this may attenuate
the goals of flexibility, specialization and efficiency. Houle underlined
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the need to create a link between government and tribunals, while also
maintaining an appropriate separation between them. These issues had
been raised in preceding discussions by Dodek and Jacobs. Houle suggested that we may want to look to the French model, in which there is a
separate administrative branch, which allows for both a link and a separation between government and administrative tribunals.
(c) "Lessons from B.C."
Philip Bryden (University of New Brunswick) next discussed
the conditions and strategies that made possible the Administrative Justice
Project (AJP) in B.C., which began in 2001 and culminated in the introduction of the Administrative Tribunals Act in 2004.
Bryden identified three key factors:
(1)

factors peculiar to B.C. political environment;

(2)

evolution of thinking about tribunal reform; and

(3)

particular aspects of the way the AJP was set up that allowed it
to be successful.

Bryden focused on the last two factors in his discussion. The
thinking about tribunal independence had evolved in B.C. to the view that
independence was not just a justice requirement. Rather, independence
was seen as part of the conditions necessary to enable tribunals to fulfill
their mandate. This connection between independence and effective administration helped to overcome a serious practical and political challenge
of convincing a wide range of different ministries to participate in tribunal
reform. Together with Attorney General leadership, this approach was
successful.
Another effective part of the approach to reform by the AJP was
to give serious thought to the role of specific tribunals and re-examine
whether it would be more effective to accomplish the underlying goals
through a tribunal, a court or some other structure. For example, the
Expropriation Compensation Board was abolished and its jurisdiction
was returned to the courts because it was recognized that the tribunal
applied general legal principles.
If it was decided that a tribunal would remain in place, the AJP
also re-examined what kind of powers and support the tribunal would
need to fulfill its mandate. This led to consideration of how to create an
effective appointment system, ensure independence, create a principled
approach to remuneration, and set out the powers and procedures of the
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tribunal. Finally, the relationship between the government host ministry,
the tribunal and the courts was given systematic consideration, and as a
result attention was given to right of appeal or judicial review and Charter
jurisdiction.
The solutions used in the reforms in B.C. were a mix oflegislative
changes and more informal changes. Not all issues, such as re-appointment, could he addressed in sufficient depth because of pragmatic political
considerations.
Whether or not we agree with all of the answers at which the
reform program arrived in B.C., the key point is that these issues were
considered in a systematic manner.
(d) "The Situation in Ontario"
Ivana Petricone (ARCH) reflected on the current situation in
Ontario and the impetus for reforms here.
One of the current strengths of administrative justice system is
the strong legal aid system for administrative tribunal users. Community
legal clinics like ARCH and Downtown Legal Services provide representation to people of low income who often appear before administrative
tribunals.
Part of the mandate of community legal clinics is law reform
advocacy on behalf of their clients. The Government Agencies Appointments Group (GAAG) was created to press for administrative justice
reform in Ontario because of the increasing problems in administrative
tribunals during the previous government. Some progress has been made:

•

Preliminary steps by the government in merit-based process;

•

Government has acknowledged that tribunal adjudicators are professionals (remuneration, appointment terms, greater resources
created for tribunals);

•

Clustering is heing studied, and while it is controversial, it may
be useful in terms of improving accessibility;

•

Legislative provisions in Human Rights Code statutorily imbed a
merit-hased appointment process.
The agenda for future reform would include:

•

Legislative scheme for all tribunal appointments (a parallel process could be created for tribunals to the one already in place for
judicial appointments).
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Independence continues to he a problem. For example, the social
benefits tribunal makes decisions that affect the ministry, and
government officials from the ministry appear as opposing parties
in the cases, hut the ministry is also responsible for the administration the tribunal. Tribunals, and the disadvantaged groups who
rely on them, need champions.

•

Improving access to legal counsel, to forms, to websites, to interpretation services.

•

Expansion of duty counsel services and advice lawyer services.

•

More academic research in the area.

Cristie Ford (UBC) (commentator) summarized and offered
comments on three dominant themes in the discussion: systematizing
learning, independence, and access to justice.
Systematizing learning within the administrative justice system
is a key part of the reform challenge. The common wealth system, as Lord
Justice Carnwath pointed out, is hottom-up; hut some reforms have had
a top-down component. The challenge is to understand how a more systematic top-down reform agenda can glean and incorporate the knowledge
on the ground in tribunals. The performance review project at T AQ may
he instructive.
The next theme has heen independence. Ford has suggested that
we need to think of independence together with accountability. In Canada,
we tend to focus more on safeguarding the structural independence of
tribunals from ministries and the executive. In the U.S., however, there
has been a converse concern ahout the accountability of administrative
agencies. Rather than orphans, the agencies are seen as unaccountable,
renegade cowboys. The Administrative Procedures Act has attempted to
reign in the agencies through notice and comment rule-making and allow
for greater public participation and transparency. In Canada, we only have
notice and comment rule-making in securities commissions and some
limited duty to consult is recognized in other contexts. Should we have a
statutory duty to consult? Do we want more accountability?
The reforms in the U.K. and Canada do not currently imagine
greater input from citizens.
Finally, on access to justice, both the reforms in B.C. and the
U.K. to the administrative justice system have heen part of wider reforms
to the justice system as a whole. In many ways, tribunals in B.C. are heing
pushed hy government to the forefront of the justice system, as the government tries to reframe access-to-justice as access-to-dispute-resolution.
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Planned reforms to the civil justice system in B.C. include the creation of
information hubs for users of the justice system, mandatory case conferences, and new procedural rules. These reforms will have enormous implications for administrative justice as well. Administrative justice is now
expected to he out in front of the courts in resolving disputes effectively
and efficiently.
One interesting new development in the B.C. reforms has been
to limit the jurisdiction of tribunals to interpret and apply the Human
Rights Code. The Administrative Tribunals Act already restricts tribunals'
jurisdiction to interpret and apply the Charter: only the Jabour relations
and securities tribunals have full Charter jurisdiction, including the power
to invalidate portions of their own legislation for being in breach of the
Charter. The new amendments impose similar limitations for the Human
Rights Code. The idea is to streamline the system: Charter issues go
straight to the courts (not tribunals), and human rights issues go straight
to the human rights tribunal (not other tribunals). These reforms were
implemented hy a politically conservative government and this has shaped
the way they have been seen. Critics of the reforms say that they take the
Charter and the Human Rights Code out of the "peoples' courts" (i.e.,
the administrative tribunals) and treat them as Holy Grail. In support of
the reforms, it can be argued that they reduce costs associated with multiple levels of review; ensure that human rights and Charter questions are
adjudicated by those with expertise in the area; and arguably that they
take the Charter and human rights legislation more seriously as a result.
Interestingly, Ford noted, although there was a Jot of concern by
poverty Jaw advocates and equality-seeking groups around the changes
to Charter jurisdiction in 2004, there has not been the same strong opposition to the more recent human rights reforms. Possible reasons for
this are that lawyers and poverty advocates found that they prefer having
Charter and human rights issues decided by expert decision-makers; that
there have been improvements to tribunals in terms of accessibility and
fairness. hence alleviating the need to resort to challenges based on the
Charter and the Human Rights Code; that direct applications to court
have turned out to be an easier route; and/or that poverty advocates and
equality-seeking groups are focused on access to counsel as the most
pressing problem they face.
Q&A (moderated by Justice John Evans, Federal Court of Appeal)
The first question was from Michael Gottheil, who asked about
the procedures in place for negotiating and setting budgets for tribunals.
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The budget can exert significant pressure on the tribunal and its Chair
and affect independence of the tribunal. Lord Justice Camwath replied
that in the U.K., this is still being worked out through the "Partnership
Model". It is hoped that the advisory board will alleviate the pressure in
negotiations and provide greater input for courts and tribunals.
Houle stated that in Quebec, the legislation specifies where
money for T AQ comes from, although not how much. However, the
budget has been stable and has even increased.
Bryden said that in B.C., two things have been done to address
budgetary issues. First, the number of people involved in the negotiations
has been reduced due to the rationalization of the system and it has been
clarified that trade-offs cannot he made between budgetary allowances
and certain kinds of decisions being reached by tribunals. Second, there
has been a memoranda of understanding project to provide greater structure to the negotiation process.
Ellis commented on the importance of change in the U.K. in
which the tribunals' administrative services have been joined and taken
away from the other ministries. Social benefits tribunals in B.C. and
Ontario, hy contrast, continue to operate under the host ministry, which
makes all appointment decisions, sets the budget, etc., but also has a direct
interest in the result of the cases before the tribunal.
5. ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION ON NEXT STEPS FOR REFORMS
IN ONTARIO

Kathy Laird (Ontario Human Rights Tribunal) began the
discussion by asking whether we have the right ingredients for reform in
Ontario.
The first comment was from Raj Anand, who noted that access
to justice underlies the debates about reforms. The ultimate issue is what
does any given reform do for the citizen who needs to use these tribunals?
For example, how can it he satisfactory to move human rights jurisdiction
to one tribunal, if that tribunal doesn't have resources, or leave human
rights complainants to their own devices by scaling back the role of the
human rights commission in bringing forward complaints, as was done
hy Bill I 07 in Ontario?
Ford commented that in B.C., the human rights tribunal does
have, relatively, fairly good resources. The government would argue that
lawyers give issues of jurisdiction more importance than clients, who just
want an effective resolution.

FUTURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE

219

Mary McKenzie provided an update on the McKenzie case. She
wass able to speak about the case now as it has evolved into public interest
litigation in which her own personal interests are no longer engaged. She
confirmed that the government did not appeal the B.C. Court of Appeal
decision, which declined to address the substance of the appeal on the
basis of mootness, but went on to declare the lower Court's decision on
the statutory interpretation and constitutional issues to be "unnecessary
obiter dictum" of "no precedential value". Ms. McKenzie and the legal
team of S.R. Ellis, Q.C., Frank Falzon, Q.C., and Barbara Mcisaac, Q.C.,
have filed an application for leave to the S.C.C. Ms. McKenzie emphasized that while we commonly refer to independence, the McKenzie case
is ultimately about ensuring that there are basic structural safeguards for
the impartiality that Canadians expect of quasi-judicial tribunals. She
added that the B.C. government's explicit assertion, in the McKenzie case,
of a statutory power to dismiss any and all tribunal adjudicators mid-term
and without cause, if upheld, effectively transforms the status of "term"
appointments to appointments at pleasure. She pointed out that in the
recent decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in Pelletier, 12 the Court
stated that a government's decision to terminate an at-pleasure appointment is nothing more nor Jess than a political decision. She queried how,
under those circumstances, quasi-judicial adjudicators who serve at pleasure can command public confidence in their impartiality.
The next question came from Patricia Hughes, who returned to
the question of whether an administrative tribunal is a generic animal or
whether we should think more about how tribunals differ in function? In
the U.K., the tribunals are treated the same, while in Quebec a distinction
is drawn between adjudicative and regulatory or policy-making tribunals.
In some discussions, we seem to be glossing over that issue and it does
seem like a threshold issue. Do we want the same kinds of protections
and structures by treating all tribunals the same way? Are we going to
Jose something of accessibility, flexibility and expertise?
Sossin replied that we may actually focus too much on trying to
describe the animal that is a tribunal. It's really the rule of Jaw to the
people who come before bodies that matters. It's the litigants' rights that
arc at stake. We need to start from the basic idea that when important
rights are at stake, a range of rule of Jaw requirements is engaged. Governments can have flexibility in devising different structures, but they
can't contract out of rule of Jaw protections. The big mistake is to start
12

Pelletier v. Canada (Attorney General), 2007 CarswellNat I, 2007 CarswellNat
2. 2007 FCA 6 (F.C.A.).
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with the question "Does judicial independence as articulated in Valente
apply?" Rather we should focus on "What rule of law protections apply
when anyone comes before a decision-maker?"
Lord Justice Camwath noted that it was not an easy process in
the U.K. to figure out what tribunals arc in and what tribunals arc out.
The Leggatt report focused on a core set of tribunals. Now, in creating
the chamber structure, there has been remarkable agreement around what
the structure should he.
Bryden pointed out there is often little relationship between what
we do on the ground and the theory. For example, professional discipline
bodies adjudicate important rights, hut the members are elected decisionmakers. In Suresh," the Supreme Court held that the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration must apply section 7 of Charter protections in
performing risk assessments for deportees. To say Jet's figure out what
the rights are and let the structure flow from it, may have little relationship
to what's on the ground.
Laird stated that the AJWG's approach has been to focus on
rights-tribunals that make really important decisions in people's lives.
There was support voiced from the audience for this approach. It was felt
that we should focus on a core group of tribunals that deliver justice and
make important decisions in people's lives. Complications around who's
in, who's out, and what the framework is, can he resolved once we make
the leap to recognizing that a core of administrative justice is part of the
justice system. A sense of urgency to push ahead with the reform agenda
in Ontario was also expressed, especially because many people feel that
the current conditions are pretty good and inertia is setting in. We need
to move beyond "satisfaction".
Mullan, however, advocated thinking about different categories
of tribunals and attempting to create a rational structure hy building on
past work, such as the Ratushny report. 14
Don Chaisson offered an international perspective on judicial
independence. In many countries with a burgeoning justice system, the
debate we are faced with in Ontario would seem very subtle. The answer
for these nations is the more robust approach of creating a separate and
independent court system that's also seen to he independent. The forum
comes first and then the rest of the structure and culture fall into place.
"
14

Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2002 CarswellNat 7,
2002 CarswellNat 8, 2002 SCC I (S.C.C.).
E. Ratushny, The Independence of Federal Administrative Tribunals and Agencies (CBA: 1990).
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Another approach suggested was to focus on the adjudicative
function of tribunals and thus create reforms for a more broad range of
tribunals, including those that also have a regulatory function.
Ellis said that the difficulty with this approach is that it's difficult
to accomplish this within a reasonable horizon. It is more realistic to start
with purely adjudicative tribunals, the straightforward cases, and deal
with them.
Lord Justice Carnwath said that this was, in effect, the process in
the U.K. and that Ellis' approach sounds quite sensible.
The Symposium concluded with an agreement to continue sharing
ideas and proposals reform, and the need to create greater understanding
and recognition of the importance of Administrative Justice.
APPENDIX "A"
Administrative Justice Bibliography

Introduction
The Administrative Justice Bibliography (AJB) is intended to
serve as an online, categorized and annotated bibliography of articles,
chapters of books, text and treatise sections, reports, press clippings,
theses, conference presentations, jurisprudence and other materials, selected by the editors as being of special potential interest to scholars,
advocates and administrators working in the field of administrative justice
tribunal design and reform.
The AJB's mission is to be a central and permanent collection of
Administrative Justice materials that are often otherwise found in disparate, and sometimes research-obscure and/or transitory places. Mainstream, administrative law materials that are readily available elsewhere
will not, for the most part, be found here.
The AJB is a project of the Administrative Justice Working
Group, an ad hoc assemblage of Ontario administrative-justice professionals who have come together in an effort to contribute their collective
experience to optimizing the fairness, independence, impartiality, competence and efficiency of the administrative justice system and its tribunals through non-partisan advocacy on behalf of that system. The Group's
members are current or past administrative-justice practitioners who bring
to the work of the Group an independent perspective together with substantial experience in the design of tribunal structures, in the academic
analyses of administrative justice issues, in the leadership, management
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and administration of tribunals, and in advocacy before a variety of such
tribunals.
The AJB does not purport to he an exhaustive collection of administrative justice materials. It is permanently a work in progress and
consists only of materials that come to the attention of the editors and are
deemed by them to be of special interest. The collection is unabashedly
biased towards the Administrative Justice Working Group's reform goals.
The AJB was launched at the Administrative Justice Working
Group's Symposium, The Future of Administrative Law, held at the Faculty of Law, University of Toronto on January 17-18, 2008.
The AJB can he accessed online. 1 ~ Comments, feedback and
additional suggestions for sources to include are most welcome!

''

http://www.law.utoronto.ca/programs/ajb.htm.

